Risk Assessment

[Roderick]

While the ISO 31000 Overview layout is so confusing as to be almost meaningless

What is confusing about the overview?

It is a very simple and effective way to explain the steps required for a risk assessment.

Establish the context: Community Theatre simple set or fire juggling clowns?

Identify the risks: Quite obvious

Analyse the risk: How bad does it get if it goes wrong, using the matrix

Evaluate the level of risk by multiplying the analysis points

Treatment: Work out the best control measures.

Simple.

 

The important bit that is too often overlooked are the two side columns, communicate & consult and monitor & review.

Consultation during the RA process is important so that nothing is missed, communication is vital for a RA to be meaningful, people can't implement or manage control they are not aware of.

Monitoring and reviewing is crucial, certainly in our industry where everyday can be different. Some control may inadvertently introduce new hazards that must be evaluated.

http://static.wixstatic.com/media/53f773_8823d9fe8f7a47568647e98a83de7ee0.png/v1/fill/w_464,h_462,al_c,lg_1/53f773_8823d9fe8f7a47568647e98a83de7ee0.png

[Jivemaster]

There is no one way of identifying risk and hazard BUT it's essential that one finds a way and uses it, but doesn't abuse it.

 

In every situation it's essential to consider the normal skill set and situational awareness of nearby people.

 

A failure to assess, evaluate and mitigate risk and hazard in any work situation will be seen as a failure in any accident enquiry. Failure to record, in a retrievable form, risk and hazard assessments and control measures could be seen as an offence in itself.

[sandall]

What is confusing about the overview?

It is a very simple and effective way to explain the steps required for a risk assessment.

To be clear, I was only referring to the "An Overview Process" chart on your 1st post as being a confusing graphic, not to the concept of flow charts per se. To be honest it reminded me of all the years of "death by PowerPoint" corporate presentations I have sat through after the "consultants" have had their day. "Effective"? - maybe, "Simple"? - if someone who has been involved in RAs & Method Statements for more than 20 years can't instantly see what it is actually trying to communicate, then maybe not.

[cedd]

I’ve always disliked the number matrix methods of risk assessment - they always seemed to focus the mind too much on numbers and too little on thinking around the issue and ultimately making things safer. I note that if you go to the HSE website nowadays their risk assessments have done away with the matrix and replaced it with a table that asks simple questions per column.

With my day job hat on we prefer to use bow tie risk analysis, which is a visual chart that I think more clearly separates and displays preemptive measures and reactive measures (no naked flames allowed Vs fire extinguishers for example).

Summary here;

https://www.cgerisk.com/knowledgebase/The_bowtie_method

[Roderick]

Oh well, I must be special then. The flow chart and the principles behind it have made sense to me ever since it was introduced as part of AS/NZS4360 in 1995. And still using it daily.

 

I am in two minds about the 'bowtie' concept. There are things I like about it but what I don't like is the lack of prioritising. The whole point of a RA, in my view, is to identify where the biggest risks are so that they can be targeted immediately where lower scores can be left for later. For the same reason I really, really dislike checklists, they give a false sense of security by giving the impression that if all the boxes are ticked, it must be good.

[sandall]

I guess we are likely to stick with the first method we meet which does the job. I only do small-scale events these days, so the BBC template suits the work I do, with the advantage that it clearly shows up-front where the buck stops for each part of the event. Scaled up to a major event it might well become unmanageable.

 

I haven't delved into the bow-tie method, but I must confess the introductory graphic threw me a bit - I'd always thought. a " preventive barrier" iwas a metal fencing panel used to keep punters out of places they shouldn't be, like the artists' bar.

[kerry davies]

Nothing wrong with "scores-on-the-doors", or indeed the "bow-tie", used by competent persons, Roderick. They are worse than useless when used by those with not enough knowledge, training, skills and experience to be called competent.

 

I don't like them because too many half-trained, well-meaning but uninformed safety officers use them instead of becoming competent when competence is the first essential need. That doesn't mean those tools are faulty but just as I wouldn't give my chainsaw to a child, a risk matrix like this can be a dangerous item in the wrong hands.

 

As for "just don't do it" then the whole point of an RA is to identify risk so that it can be managed down to acceptable levels. There are whole sections of our industry that would not exist if severe risk was not involved. We deal with it by becoming competent in the practice and competent in the safe management of that practice.

 

Paulears makes just this point about circus. Heaven knows what the "scores" would have been for my old muckers, Archaos or Kiss My Axe. The C.O.K.E. RA was tricky enough, having guitarists leaping off scaff towers onto trampolines mid lead break, but naked chainsaw jugglers illuminated by flamethrowers was bonkers.

This industry managed it though!

[sandall]

In defence, m'Lud the phrase "just don't do it" was aimed at the "do I need to do a risk assessment, & if so, where do I start?" end of the market, rather than the naked juggling with chainsaws & flamethrowers on a high-wire with no safety-net brigade, who probably wouldn't understand the word "don't" anyway.

[Charlotte_R]

I was always taught to do the BBC method, although the templates I had were a little bigger.

• Hazard (What can go wrong?)
• Likelihood of it going wrong before mitigation (as a high/medium/low likelihood or frequency of occurance, eg, once every ten years rather than a number)
• Consequence of it going wrong before mitigation (as a high/medium/low consequence or the result, eg, minor injury rather than a number)
• Risk before mitigation (likelihood x consequence) - this is usually hidden within the spreadsheet, and the likelihood / consequence given by colour coding the likelihood / consequence columns
• General mitigation strategy (eg: reduce severity of consequences, reduce likelihood of it happening, or both)
• Detailed mitigation (this is where you put your plan)
• Likelihood of it going wrong after mitigation
• Consequence of it going wrong after mitigation
• Risk after mitigation (again, this is hidden and the likelihood / consequence are colour coded)

So, for tripping over cables, I would record the following:

• Tripping over cables
• Medium
• Medium
• (4) - auto calculated, so previous columns are orange
• Reduce likelihood
• Run cables outside of walkways where possible. Run cables above head height if practical when crossing walkways. Tape cables running across walkways or run in cable ramp. Minimise the number of places where cables cross walkways.
• Low (The liklihood has been reduced)
• Medium (The consequence of someone falling is still the same)
• (2) - auto calculated, so previous columns are green

Sorted!

I like the idea behind the numbering system, but I feel that saying low / medium / high is better than 1 / 2 / 3.

 

[Jivemaster]

Is it really critical which system is used? Essentially you need a risk assessment for almost anything work related, but done simply and put in writing is better than doing nothing.

 

Doing nothing WILL be seen as incompetence in the event of an incident and investigation.

[sandall]

Indeed. The simpler you keep it the better, The more detail you squeeze into your "mitigation" column the more you leave yourself open to an ambulance-chasing lawyer making a case that you wrote "x", but you actually did "y" instead ("y" might well have been a better idea, but your whole RA now has come under scrutiny).

[Jivemaster]

IMO and only that, a major production may need layers of risk assessment. One overarching document with some linked pages dealing with specifics.

[sunray]

Today I was asked to go through a CV which contained a set of RAMS documents from a potential sub contractor (sounds a lot grander than the situation is). It is a several generations photocopy and the heading has obviously been stuck on before the copy was made. Trouble is it is one of my documents which I prepared for a BBC contract some 10 years ago. I added some errors to the original and printed it out then handed it to the guy, suggesting a fresh version would look better. He seemed grateful.

 

Should I feel as guilty as I do?

[paulears]

Sunday - I love that situation. Had it when I was working for BTEC. "It's a shame that on the next page he has spelled luminaire luminary" - strange looks and the teacher turned over and there it was. Pinched from my website I'd forgotten all about, but Google hadn't! I wanted to award the Distinction to me!

 

Seriously though - sharing RAs is quite a flaw in any system. It isn't the presence of the bit of paper, it's the process behind it, so using somebody else's RA doesn't make the real world safer.